Lindsay Wilson
Gender Performativity and Objectification
Although “objectification” is an important concept in feminist theory, much of academic work in
feminist philosophy focuses on the details of what exactly objectification is and why it is harmful, rather
than why precisely it is that instances of objectification so often involve the objectification of women or
women-presenting persons. One possible answer to this issue utilizes Judith Butler’s theory of “gender
performativity” put forth in Gender Trouble and expanded upon in her essay “Performative Acts and
Gender Constitution: An Essay in Feminist Epistemology”. Gender performativity is the theory that
gender and gender roles are elaborate social performances that one puts on in day-to-day life, the
hegemonic versions of which underlay popular conceptions of “man”/ “masculine” and “woman”/
“feminine”. If it is, indeed the case that “woman” and “man” are performed and reinforced in everyday
life, then it is not just our own self-conception, but other’s reaction to our gender performances that
shapes gender identification. The constant reduction of women to objects seems to serve as an important
mechanism to reinforce the gendering of persons who are or are assumed to be female as “women”persons who are properly in heterosexual relationships with persons gendered as “male”. Persons
gendered as women are also, hegemonically speaking “supposed” to be feminine, and derive selfdefinition from the way in which they subscribe to feminine norms. Yet those norms frequently relegate
them to secondary or submissive roles1.
Although it is sometimes posited as such, objectification not an isolated instance of sexist
expression by an individual person, but a crucial part of the “performance of gender” and the
heteronormative assumptions which underlie our construction of gender roles. Objectification- the act of
treating a person like an object rather than an agentive being- is often significantly gendered and, further,
it is central to the process of gendering a person, and rendering them legible as human beings. This essay
will also use Lina Papadaki’s essay “What is Objectification” for an overview of the definition of
“objectification”, and use Judith Butler’s theory of “gender performativity”. Since gender is constituted,
1

Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.( New York: Routledge, 1999) 10-22.

Lindsay Wilson
not from an “essence” of “woman-ness” or “man-ness” but from a series of stylized acts that the actors
come to see as natural and inevitable, objectification serves to codify this divide. Objectification is
something, according to this definition, that can only happen to someone who is socially positioned, to
have less social power, because they are the party in a position to be treated as an object- less than human.
Although, according to this definition, there are undoubtedly various other forms of objectification that
center around other social power imbalances, this essay will focus on gendered objectification. It argues
that objectification is not a side effect of improperly understanding another person’s humanity, but rather
a crucial part of the way “gender”- which is an important part of seeing a person as a person- is
formulated in our society2. I first review a traditional feminist conception of “objectification” put forth by
Lina Papadaki and afterwards give a further explanation of how gender performativity ties into this. I then
explain how, in fusing these two ideas together, we can come to a better understanding of how
performativity of gendered roles disadvantages women and, finally, I consider and objection.
Lina Papadaki defends a thesis based on a revision of several seminal texts on objectification by
MacKinnon/Dworkin (two dominance feminists) and Martha Nussbaum (a humanist feminist). For
MacKinnon and Dworkin sexual objectification is systemically enforced, not only through sexual
relations, but through the reduction of women to submissive sexual objects through patriarchy and more
specifically through hyper-sexualization of the female body3. McKinnon and Dworkin argue that
objectification harms all women, not just those sexually used by men. Unlike McKinnon, or Dworkin,
Nussbaum thinks that objectification does not necessarily constitute a harm. According to her seven
criterion - treating a person as an instrument, inert, fungible, violable, owned, denied autonomy, or denied
subjectivity - negative objectification involves ignoring or improperly acknowledging a person’s
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humanity, but not necessarily severely damaging to her/his rational capacities, and positive/benign
objectification involves seeing a person as an object in a way that does not deny her humanity.4
Papadaki argues that all of these conceptions of objectification miss something important. For
MacKinnon/Dworkin that is the questionable claim that objectification necessarily harms a person’s
humanity-defined as their capacity for rational choice, and Nussbaum’s theory entails that we objectify
almost everyone in our day-to-day lives, making objectification so broad as to hardly be meaningful.
Papadaki proposes doing away completely with Nussbaum’s positive/benign objectification, as something
that detracts from the serious nature of objectification while maintaining her negative conception as the
only definition5. And in order to further capture some of the complexity of objectification as harmful vs
merely ignoring a person’s rational capacities, Papadaki proposes a separation between reductive and
non-reductive objectification, reductive being harmful to one’s rational nature while non-reductive
involves simply ignoring/not fully acknowledging their humanity6. She then proposes a further separation
between intentional and non-intentional objectification.7
Although Papadaki’s version is very interesting, and an excellent overview of feminist theories of
objectification, it seems to miss something important by defining objectification as something that is
problematic primarily because it harms “rational capacities”- thus focusing on episodic instances of
objectification, rather than viewing objectification as a system. Papadaki’s focus is on classifying episodes
of objectification or objectifying behavior as “intentional/non-intentional” or “reductive/non-reductive”
rather than examining what type of systemic conditions would cause this behavior to be so endemic,
particularly directed towards women. McKinnon’s theories come closer to capturing why it is that
objectification of women/women-presenting persons is so frequent and pervasive. In Only Words she
argues that “Social inequality is substantially created and enforced- that is done [emphasis hers]- through
words and images. Social hierarchy cannot and does not exist without being embodied in meanings and
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expressed in communications”8. MacKinnon’s focus is primarily on the over-sexualization of women,
through pornography and sex work, which is certainly a frequent site of objectification, but, I argue, still
not the core of the issue. To look at this issue, I think one must first understand what gender is, and what
purpose it serves in society, and to do that, this paper will employ Judith Butler’s theory of gender.
Butler’s conception of gender differs radically from what one might refer to as the common-sense
view of gender. Called “gender performativity”, it is the view that:
gender is in no way a stable identity of locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it
is an identity tenuously constituted in time [. . .] an identity instituted through the stylization of
the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures,
movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self”9 .
It is in the repetition of these gestures, movements and enactments that gender is constitutedalbeit misleadingly- as a stable, essential identity or structuring principle. I use the term “constituted” to
reference the ways in which gender is a social construction, thus constituted or put together by broader
social mores, as opposed to merely “expressed” as an external indication of an internal truth. And,
although gender is a performance, it is not an entirely voluntary one- gender does not express an
“essence” hidden somewhere deep within the body or psyche but Butler also argues “Discrete genders are
part of what “humanizes” individuals within contemporary culture; indeed, those who fail to do their
gender right are regularly punished”10. In other words, gender is a performance because it is not
something we possess (as a hormonal make-up, a body structure, or even a mindset) it is something that
we do- a constant performance of binary opposition between masculinity and femininity, often
conciliatory sometimes disruptive.
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If gender is, in fact a performance and one located in the various acts that constitute it, then an
“act” performed with the frequency and gendered under- and overtones that sexual objectification carries
needs serious investigation. What I (and Butler mean) when I say “gender is located in the acts that
constitute it” is a brief summary of performativity. Gender performativity posits that gender is made up
of the acts that mark a person as “man” or “woman” (dress, mannerisms, ect) and it is through the
repetition of those gendered acts that the illusion of a stable gender identity is created. As stated above,
the stakes for not performing gender “right” are punishments of various sorts and those punishments exist
because gender is an important way we “read” people- a way we make them legible as human beings who
have subjectivity and are worthy of being treated as such. We “read” people for all sorts of things- social
cues, personality traits, race, ect.- and use these characteristics to fit the person in question into categories
within the larger schema of “human”. If readers think back, many can likely remember a time when they
couldn’t quite read a person’s gender, and the resulting confusion. The very structure of our language all
but necessitates knowing a person’s gender in order refer to them with a pronoun. Persons who do not
easily fit into “he” or “she”, start to fit more neatly into “it”- a category usually reserved for non-subjects.
So gendering becomes a way to humanize persons in our culture, but if gendering is a way to mark
persons as subjects deserving of respect, there is something strange going with women and
objectification. Objectification serves to dehumanize women, even those who properly perform their
gender according to hegemonic standards. Thus, ironically, they are dehumanized for doing the very
thing that is supposed to make them legitimate as a valuable and agentive human being.
If objectification is treating someone as an instrument, inert, fungible, violable, owned, denied
autonomy, or denied subjectivity in a way that is harmful (as Papadaki defines it), then it seems like it
would be a very episodic occurrence- after all, there is not usually someone whispering in the ears of
various persons to treat women as though they are merely instruments for cis-gender males’ emotional or
sexual satisfaction. In a way, it is episodic- recall that gender is constituted in the repetition of acts- but
those discrete acts only make sense because there is a larger discourse about what it is that certain bodies,
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appearances and gestures are “supposed” to mean. For example, if wearing short skirt equals a sexually
available women, than making very aggressive sexual advances on public transportation makes sense,
particularly if the person making those advances also assumes that the person is heterosexual and female.
However, if a person who looked less “female” wore a short skirt in public the response would like range
from odd glances to transphobic violence. The two individuals in question were performing the same
behavior- wearing a short skirt on public transit- but the response is completely different because of
explicit social assumptions - skirts should only be worn by women, women should have certain physical
characteristics, people with “woman” physical characteristics who wear short skirts are clearly signaling
sexual availability, ect. There was likely no voice whispering in the ear of the person who decided to
make sexual advances on the short skirt wearing woman on public transit telling them to do so, but the
action makes sense within a particular, gendered framework that our society has in place. Remember that
gender here is a performance- men become and are constantly becoming men by properly performing
masculinity and women by properly performing femininity. Popular opinion has it based in all sorts of
physiological, hormonal and otherwise biological factors, and these factors frequently influence the way
persons see their own gender identity- if they were labeled male at birth they tend to see themselves as
men- but that performance of masculinity is what has a man continually “made” a man.
Gender is a means of humanizing, of making people legible as people and marking them for
according treatment. But for women, gendering serves as a strange double-bind- to “improperly” gender
oneself is to risk some form of retribution, sometimes violent, for not following the gender binary, but to
“properly” gender oneself does not open up the possibility of full humanity either. Objectification serves
as one background against which the gender binary pulls a type of bait-and-switch on women’s gender
performance- doling out humanity based on the proper “performance” of gendered norms but then taking
it away by function of the constant treatment as merely tools for the sexual and emotional gratification of
other people. And this objectification is not just sexual- when a woman properly performs the role of
motherhood, she is constantly required to put the needs of her child above her own, thus treating herself
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as an object through which the emotional and physical needs of the child are met. This is not to say that
mothers get nothing out of the experience of raising children, but rather that it is a very gendered
experience (fathers are hardly expected to give the same level of care to their children) and that on top of
being quite gendered, it is demanding, in a way that requires putting the needs of another person
constantly ahead of one’s own. Although the instances themselves are episodic, their constant
reoccurrence and the background discourse of “the good selfless mother” provide a framework to make
these seemingly episodic occurrences into a system that continually treats mothers as objects that raise
children into maturity. The same could be said of the earlier example of the woman in wearing a skirt that
a man on public transit perceived as short- as an episodic occurrence it is annoying but as a reoccurring
trope it becomes a way to reinforce the constant policing of women’s bodies- women who wear short
skirts deserve to be sexual harassed because they are “acting” in a way that telegraphs sexual availability.
The performance of sexual objectification in the form of harassment serves to establish a power dynamicthe objectifier has a right to “read” the objectified as a sexual object whether she likes it or not. This
situation is easy to see because it involves an obvious actor-act- mediator relationship and involves an
imposition of this relationship against the objectified individual’s will, but gendered objectification is not
only important in cases of sexual harassment. The power dynamic in the mother-child relationship above
may seem less obviously problematic- after all, the mother is providing for the child, who (presumably)
cannot provide for themself and the mother seems to be treating herself as an object rather than allowing
another person to impose that reading on her actions. But, in considering both what objectification is and
why it happens at such a systemic level, one must consider why it is that person would seemingly
objectify themselves- why would a mother put her own needs so far behind that of her child, as to treat
herself as nothing more than a means to fulfilling that child’s needs? This is partially because social
mores around motherhood dictate that “good” mothers look after their child(ren) before they look after
themselves, and failing to properly perform proper motherhood carries a range of penalties from social
ostracization to state intervention and loss of parental rights. Self-definition and identity are also caught
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up in the ways we perform our identities, and if one of those identities is that of a mother, it is likely
important that that role is performed well.
One might object that we all have “roles” which come with normative pressures- men have them,
women have them and there is nothing uniquely problematic about the ones that women face. After all,
under this theory, everybody performs gender all the time- men have to “perform” as properly masculine
subjects which could itself be a form of objectification. It is true, that performing a very stereotypical
version of masculinity in which one was independent, high-performing, and competitive seems like a very
lonely existence. Women, although they are compelled by the various sources listed above to constantly
give their emotional and sexual labor to others, get to having meaningful connections with other persons,
that masculinity does not offer. But consider, first, the great social/economic value on placed labor that
takes place within the competitive economic structure in the US- even more care based jobs, like teaching
and nursing work that are part of the traditional, paid economy (as opposed to something like a stay-athome mother, which is uncompensated labor) are much less financially lucrative than a job in the
competitive and un-ironically male dominated tech sector11. Masculine performances get the financial
rewards, social recognition as valuable, and can depend on feminine performances of care and selfsacrifice. Women get no such reciprocation for emotional and sexual labor provided, besides perhaps a
tenuous financial security that could be revoked if the relationship ends. Proper performance of femininity
makes open competitiveness less acceptable but more individualistic and competitive attitudes are
rewarded in society at large.
Although most feminist theories of objectification have acknowledged that objectification is a
systemic problem that primarily effects women, they tend to focus on defining it based on episodic
occurrences (whether or not a particular action “counts” as objectifying and why) rather than considering
why it is a systemic occurrence that tends to break down along gender lines. In using Butler’s theory of
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gender performativity to analyze the very structure of gender- one that serves to make legible and thus
humanize persons- it seems that we can reframe objectification as a systemic occurrence that is
significantly gendered and also important to the very process of constituting gendered categories.

